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1. Europ. fusion - safety studies I
Safety&Environmental Assessments 
of Fusion Power (SEAFP-1) 1990-94
 Commercial power station blankets (model S1 and S2).
 Consideration of effluents from normal operation, occupational doses, accidents 
(worst-case assumption), and waste management.
Safety & Environmental Assessment of Fusion Power – Long Term Program 
(SEAL) 1995-98
 DEMO models (WC, BC, BOT, BIT) 
 Aim at broadening the scope and elaborating selected aspects in more detail
SEAFP-2 1997-98
 Plant models 1, 2 (MINERVA-W), 3 (MINERVA-H)
 To meet safety goals by low-activation martensitic steels or 
more advanced materials 
SEAFP-99
 Plant models 4, 5, 6
 Waste management studies 
Power Plant Conceptual Study (PPCS) 2001-2004
 Model A (WCLL), B (HCPB), C (DCLL), D (SCLL), AB (HCLL)
 Demonstration of the credibility, the safety and environmental advantages and the 
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1. Europ. fusion safety studies II
ITER 1998-
 A large-scale scientific experiment aiming to 
demonstrate technological & scientific feasibility
of fusion energy (Q  10)
 HCPB and HCLL TBMs and other 4 TBMs 
outside Europe
 ITER safety & licensing 
(fundamental structure)
DEMO EFDA roadmap 
 Fusion Electricity
 Component Design & Engineering Design by 
EUROfusion
 Selection from 4 blanket concepts 
(HCPB, HCLL, WCLL, DCLL)
 WPSAE WBS 2014-2018
 Design and licensing requirements
 Integrated safety analyses / source terms / 
models & codes
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1. Europ. fusion safety studies III - Comparison baseline
















CC  =Chemical control
CPS=Coolant purification system
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2. Fusion safety approach I
Safety requirements*
 Protection of public and environment against radiological hazards 
 Protection of site workers against radiation exposure according to ALARA-principle 
(As Low As Reasonably Achievable)
 Employment of measures to prevent accidents and mitigate their consequences
 Elimination of need for public evacuation in any accident
 Minimization of activated waste
Safety functions*
 Primary safety functions
 Confinement of radioactive materials
 Control of operational releases
 Limitation of accidental releases
 Secondary safety functions
 Ensure emergency plasma shutdown
 Provisions for (passive) decay heat removal
 Control of thermal energy (coolant(-s) enthalpy)
 Control chemical energies
 Control of magnetic energy discharge
 Limitation of airborne& liquid operating releases to environment
*PPCS GDRD 2004
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Defence in Depth Safety Concept (DiD) *
Definition of plant state levels in DiD  solid data base in ITER / PPCS





operation Prevention of abnormal operation and failures
Conservative design 








Control of abnormal 
operation and detection of 
failures




Plant shall return 












features and accident 
procedures
Plant shall return 









Control of severe plant 
conditions incl. prevention of 












Mitigation of radiological 







2. Fusion safety approach II
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Definition of plant state levels in DiD
*INSAG 2010, WENRA2012
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2. Fusion safety approach IV
Radiation protection and acceptance criteria
 Identification of potential sources of radiation & source inventories
 Limits of radiation doses to the public and to site personnel in states of operation, 
maintenance and decommissioning
 Prevention / mitigation of radiation exposures from accidents
Identification of Postulated Initiating Events (PIEs)
 HAZOP (Hazard and Operability)
 MLD (Master Logic Diagram)*
 FFMEA (Functional Failure Modes and Effects Analysis ) / FMEA
Event sequences of incidents and accidents, consequences
 Determination of the maximum releasable inventories 
 Analysis of the incidents / accidents scenarios
 Bounding accidents
 Assessment wrt to radiological hazard
 Early and chronic doses to MEI (=Most Exposed Individual)
* Several errors/malfunctions have to occur to allow for a release
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Fusion safety approach V
Postulated initiating events (internal events)
 Similar as in nuclear power plants such as 
 Loss of flow accident (LOFA),
Loss of offsite-power (SBO), Leaks (VV, Primary System, …), Fire & explosion 
 Fusion specific events: loss of cryogenic system, arcing , magnet system faults 
 affecting barriers 
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2. Fusion safety approach VI
Safety risk approach
 Discrimination 
Design Basis Accidents (DBA)
* Design Basis Extension in ITER ~ BDBA Gulden,2012

















mean nat. dose 1mSv/a
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2. Fusion safety approach VI
Safety risk approach
 Mitigation into the acceptable risk zone by countermeasures 
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3. Comparison of the safety concept between fusion 
and fission I
German nuclear safety regulation, i.e. safety requirements for 
nuclear power plants (NPP) of 2012*.
Direct application of the current nuclear regulations to a FPP will not be 
possible without fusion specific adaptions due to the differences in 
underlying physics and technologies.
Enveloping event 
 Identification of energy sources causing/accelerating an event 
 Quantification of sources of radioactive inventory (source term(s))
 Assessment of 
 release fractions (by energy inventories and mechanistic arguments-deterministic), 
 Release time (deterministic) and 
 ambient conditions (weather –probabilistic)
Result
 Analysis of dose rates in three domains (vital area – in plant), protected area (1km at 
fence border) and to public (>1km) for most exposed individual (MEI)
* Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit: „Sicherheitsanforderungen an Kernkraftwerke“. 22.11.2012.
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3. Comparison of the safety concept between fusion 
and fission II
Worst dose rates estimates (for the same power) 
 Different source terms
 Fusion: tritium, dust, activation products, Activated Corrosion products (ACPs), neutron 
sputtering products. Tritium inventory in the Vacuum Vessel (VV) ~1kg.
 Fission nuclides of PWR: Iodine, Cs-137, noble gases, aerosols, ... 
 NPP: effective dose of DBA ≤ 50mSv. BDBA e.g. 100mSv  evacuation
 Fusion: bounding accident ≤ 50mSv  no evacuation
Doses of FPP reactor concepts several orders of magnitude lower than hypothetical 
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3. Comparison of the safety concept between fusion 
and fission III
Reactivity control, fuel and inventory
 NPP: largest part of the inventory stored inside the fuel rods 
 requirements for the fuel,
 handling and for the control of reactivity and 
 prevention of re-criticality.
 Fusion: Excursions of the reaction rate can be excluded due to inherent features of the 
design
x not applied to FPP: control of reactivity
 applied to FPP: shutdown of the facility under any circumstances 
Barriers
 NPP: multiple barriers on several consecutive levels of defense for confinement of the 
radioactive materials
 Fusion: inventories of source terms are not concentrated locally. Active retention functions 
like detritiation systems are used.
 applied to FPP: physical barriers and retention systems
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3. Comparison between the fusion safety concept and 
the nuclear fission safety concept II
Defense in depth and independence of levels of defense 
 NPPs: several safety functions are ensured by multiple installations related 
to different levels of defense
 Fusion: safety concept is also based on the concept of levels of defense.
 assign the safety functions of a FPP to certain level(s) of defense, if plant design will be 
available
 applied to FPP: defense in depth, but the independence of the different measures and 
installations for all safety functions is currently not possible
External events and very rare man-made external hazards 
 A complete fission reactor safety analysis shall incorporate an analysis of the impact of 
external events on the plant.
 In ITER for the first time, and they will be covered in the safety concept of on-going 
DEMO, as well as for future FPPs.
First of its kind
 NPP: use of proven technologies and qualified materials as well as validated calculation 
methods for the safety demonstration based on operational experience
 FPP: only minor operational experience is available for a power plant.
x not applied to FPP: requirements with respect to the evaluation of the operation experience
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3. Comparison between the fusion safety concept and 
the nuclear fission safety concept III
Cooling 
 NPPs: decay heat from fuel elements has to be removed to avoid eventual 
fuel element damage and the break of barriers
 Fusion: decay heat of in-vessel components at EOC (blanket, divertor, etc.)
 applied to FPP: requirements regarding cooling 
Leak before break 
 NPP: certain parts of the piping the component integrity is guaranteed by applying the 
“leak-before-break concept” (LBB) in the plant design.
 Fusion: LBB concept cannot be assessed currently.
 applied to FPP: LBB concept
17 Safety of Fusion Power Plants in View of Fission Regulations | Stieglitz et al. 28th SOFT, 2014, San Sebastian, Spain
4. Major results of the review of the fusion safety 
concept study 
Fusion safety concepts relies on state-of-the-art safety concepts for nuclear 
installations containing radioactive environment and is based on DiD concept.
Physical & engineering differences to NPP (e.g. radiologic inventories, stored internal 
energies, power densities and potential release paths) necessitate other safety 
systems in a FPP  require additional complementary research.
Implementation of the major safety functions (inventory confinement, cooling and reactivity 
control) similar  Translation into different technological solutions (e.g. multiple barriers) 
mandatory.
Fundamental safety principles wrt. to initiating events and corresponding radiological 
consequences are respected, but detailed design (which holds also for probabilistic safety 
analysis) for quantification required. 
Passive safety features with additional active and passive safety measures allow in principle 
limitation of consequences within plant, but future regulations will require also a 
robustness to external events. 
Confinement and reactivity control (decay heat) by functionality specification addressed and 
respected.  Demonstration by validated codes lacking (magnets, release fractions, failure 
modes, …..)
Systematic assignment of measures and installations to safety levels elaborated, but 
several measures are addressing different safety levels.
Feasibility of transferring fission regulations  DEMO safety concept
18 Safety of Fusion Power Plants in View of Fission Regulations | Stieglitz et al. 28th SOFT, 2014, San Sebastian, Spain
5. Application of the transferable fission safety 
concept to DEMO
Superior safety objectives
 Take all reasonably practical measures (design provisions,…) to prevent accidents 
in nuclear installations and to mitigate their consequences they should occur. 
 Ensure with a high level of confidence that, for all possible accidents taken into account 
in the design of the installation (incl. those of very low probability, any radiological
consequences would be minor and below prescribed limits (ALARA-principle) 
 Ensure that the likelihood of accidents with serious consequences is very low (if possible 
avoidance of any off-site emergency responses irrespective of anticipated event)
 Preservation of investment 
Secondary fusion specific safety objectives 
 Minimization of rad-waste, immobilization of radiologic inventory at any external / internal hazard 
employing ALARA principle. 
 On-site fuel management and material conditioning (evt. reprocessing)
Defence in depth principle (DiD)
Significant differences DEMO to ITER (DEMOITER+)
 higher fluences (dpa, damage / material)  fluence (fast reactors), energy density (acc.)
 higher tritium inventories (enlarged tritium plant, detritiation systems,…)
 large spatially distributed nuclear inventories with different damage rates, mobilities (ACP´s, 
transmutation products, waste storage / management facilities)
 different energy sources in magnitude, temporal behavior ( decay heat, magnetic system, PHTS-
energy production, tritium plant, dust, gas purification, …)
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Safety demonstration approach
 applied in hierarchical from plant to subsystem level (in ITER)
 transferability to DEMO possible
superior safety objectives & goals
fundamental safety functions
probabilistic 
success criteria Defence in depth principle
Level 1: prevention
Level 2: control
Level 3: accident management
Level 4: control of severe conditions
Level 5: mitigation of radiological consequences




* Master logic diagram 
Gen IV safety approach
General*
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 4/5 static subsequent enveloped barriers
 Static barriers for release control (mainly 
related to barriers + PAR+ PRS)
 „practical elimination“ of level 5 by design +
core catcher + mitigation chains
 Compact system, small control volume, 
high power density, rare release paths
NPP- PWR 
 Two static barriers extended over large scale
 Mixture of static and dynamic barriers (DTS, 
TES, HVACS)
 Large sets of active + passive systems (but 
lower inventory and energy content )
 Large volume, low power density, several 




 Control of releases
 Limitation of releases
Safety functions
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 Design measures (CR, n-poison)
 DHR systems
 not required (limited on-site storage of SA)
 Multi-stage systems for severe accidents
Secondary safety functions
 Terminate nuclear reactions
 Ensure decay heat
 Controlled chemical, magnetic, and thermal discharge
 Limitations of release to ambient
PWR 
 FPSS (intrinsic feature-but early detection)
 Passive design provisions
 Physically different sub-systems required 
 Mobile species to identify
FPP
FPSS
 Cryostat confinement ?
 Double-walled containment ?
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“Safety – Licensing” – Plant Level 
ALARA principle for
 normal and off-normal events ( low event frequency)
 design robustness and material choice (activation, self-limiting design)
 maintenance, reprocessing and disposal 

















• fusion power shutdown 
• Decay Heat Removal 
(DHR) 
• monitoring, and 











DemonstrationDefence in Depth (DiD- Barrier concept)
barrier 
defintion
Top level basic design design verification validation, licensing
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Consequences for fusion safety concept in transition of 
ITER  DEMO 
 Definitions safety functions transferrable
 Classification of structure, systems and components (SSC) in safety importance 
classes (SIC) adequate (according to inventory or potential to initiate in- / accident)
Lessons to learn from ITER 
 Functionality of safety systems (FPSS, VVPSS, detritiation systems – HVAC, WDS, VDS, 
CCWS, H2-dust mitigation, PAR, electric, magnetic discharge units, …)
 Operational communication and control management
 Failure rates of safety important novel components, control systems 
 Enhanced deterministic, probabilistic safety assessment (reduction of margins)
Novel to DEMO (* from N. Taylor, 2012, safety issues for fusion nuclear facilities and lessons learned from ITER)
 Quasi steady state operation @ high availability
 Tritium self-sufficiency and considerable larger circulating inventory, 
 Novel material(s) mandatory (design codes, fatigue, safety margins)
 Energy production 
 On-site storage of activated components (15 blanket+30 divertor generations)
 on-site reprocessing ? 
Impact on DEMO safety 
 Modified and expanded confinement strategy
 Development of complementing additional active and passive safety systems
 Development of on-line (+quasi real time) monitoring control systems
DEMO safety definition of safety functions
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Secondary heat removal 
system (partially, LOHS ?) 
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6. Open issues
Energy inventories wrt.
 release time 
 detection of failures 
Nuclide inventories
 release paths / fractions
 Tritium saturation in structures
 Diffusion / monitoring in 
structures
 Max. allowed release fractions 
(Be / SiC = ? )
Operationalisation of safety 
by design 
 PHTSs (Blanket, Divertor, NBI)
 Material criteria
 Monitoring control (time scale, 
redundancy, diversity)
 Release path @ anticipated 
failure
Dust inventory and removal
Plasma instabilities 
 time scales
 early detection systems / diversity 
 prevention measures - shut-down proc.
Magnets 
 Evolution of magnet faults (structure, 
arcing, quench detection, …) 
 Station black out requirements 
“Nuclear Fuel” 
 inventory (free, stored in structures) e.g. 
temperature dependence
 interaction with structures / residuals
 on-line accountancy
 potential for in-pile failure
Coolant enthalpy
 interaction with in-vessel components
 coolant activation (ACP) & control 
(e.g. erosion products)
 activity & integrity monitoring
 potential for in-pile failure
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6. Open issues as identified 
Operational probation of
 safety relevant control systems, components or detectors in 
nuclear environment (accuracy, failure resistance, …)
 Intrinsic / defined barriers (failure mode, aggravating effects in case of failure, …)
Material behavior at high irradiation doses  IFMIF 
 Material data base (design rules, failure resistance, operational measure/threads)
 Design margins for design / safety margins to be set
 Potential interactions with coolants (corrosion/erosion, SCC, IASCC, fretting, 




 TES (Tritium Extraction System) – efficiency, failure scenarios, time scales –
doubling time
 CPS (Coolant Purification Systems) – efficiency, malfunction monitoring, …
 Tritium mitigation techniques
 all around the tritium plant …
27 Safety of Fusion Power Plants in View of Fission Regulations | Stieglitz et al. 28th SOFT, 2014, San Sebastian, Spain
AIM discuss and prepare list of non considered issues in view of DEMO safety
PRF    = Permeation Reduction Factor
PCS    = Power Conversion System
BB       = Breeding Blanket
SG       = Steam Generator
TES = Tritium removal rate in TES
perm,BB = Tritium permeation rate through BB cooling 
structures 
perm,SG = Tritium permeation rate through SG tubes 
loss = total Tritium loss
CPS = fraction of total mass flow rate
Tritium mitigation techniques
 Permeation Barrier 
6. Open issues as identified 
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6. Open issues as identified 
Safety against external hazards- (“Fukushima challenge”)
 Earthquake
 Flooding 
 Air plane crash
 Terrorist attack 
 More stringent rules for robustness demonstration against external hazards for 
NPP  (FPP)  are expected 
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Hmax = 10 mm
Hmax = 2 mm
Starting H-AVT-Chemistry
 Iron Ingress into Steam Generators Unit
 Dedicated coolant chemistry (Hydrazine-doping, Ammonia, pH ~10)
 not applicable to fast spectrum systems ( e.g. FUSION)
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